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ARTICLES

REREADING WARREN AND BRANDEIS:
PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND
APPROPRIATION
Robert C. Post*
1
REREADING WARREN AND BRANDEIS, as one must on2
this hundredth anniversary of their "monumental article,"
comes as something of a shock. The prestige and enormous influence of the piece3 creates expectations of sweeping vistas and irresistible arguments. But, setting aside the rhetorically powerful
(and often quoted) passages of complaint against the irresponsibility of the press,4 the article offers instead a technical and rather
dry exposition of the legal rights of unpublished authors and art-

* Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley. I am grateful to the many friends and colleagues who have read this essay and improved it through their useful and constructive suggestions: David Anderson, Steve Barnett,
John Dwyer, Melvin Eisenberg, John Fleming, Ruth Gavison, Sheldon Halpern, Sheldon
Messinger, Frank Michelman, Paul Mishkin, Andrea Peterson, Mark Rose, Ferdinand
Schoeman, Jerome Skolnick, and Ragesh Tangri.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personalityand History, 55 Nw.
U.L. REV. 553, 553 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383
(1960).

4. Compare Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 n.16 (1975), with
Godkin, The Right to Privacy, 51

NATION

496, 496 (1890).
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ists. The argument that carries the actual work of the article is
intended to demonstrate that the law of common law copyright,
usually conceptualized in terms of property, should rather be seen
as resting on "the right to privacy, as a part of the more general
right to the immunity of the person, the right to one's
personality." 5
In fact the central thrust of Warren and Brandeis's article on
"the right to privacy" is to disentangle privacy from property, and
the subsequent influence of the piece rests in great measure upon
its success in that effort. As one court remarked, duly noting the
leading contribution of Warren and Brandeis's article: "Basically,
recognition of the right to privacy means that the law will take
cognizance of an injury, even though no right of property or contract may be involved and even though the damages resulting are
exclusively those of mental anguish."'
There is no small irony in this. Warren and Brandeis acknowledged as one of the chief motivations for their article the
"feeling," which had been growing "[f]or years," that "the law
must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons."' 7 They therefore advanced as the "simplest case" of their proposed right of privacy the "right of one who
has remained a private individual, to prevent his public portraiture." Yet many of the early privacy cases that recognized this
claim against "public portraiture" did so explicitly on the grounds
that "one has an exclusive right to his picture, on the score of its
being a property right of material profit." 9
Moreover seventy years after the publication of The Right to
Privacy, when William, Prosser magisterially divided the privacy
tort' 0 into four distinct causes of action," he wrote that "appro5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 207.
6. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 II1. App. 293, 299, 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (1952);
see Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 82, 85, 291 P.2d 194, 199

(1955).
7.
8.
9.
Edison v.
1907).

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
Id. at 213.
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 660, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (1911); see
Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 143, 67 A. 392, 395 (N.J. Ch.

10. The privacy tort was initially undifferentiated. See

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §

867 (1939):
Section 867. Interference with Privacy
A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited
to the public is liable to the other.
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priation," or the claim that a defendant has taken "for the defendant's advantage, . . . the plaintiff's name or likeness," ought
to be founded upon an interest that is "not so much a mental as a
proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and
likeness as an aspect of his identity. u2 What we now call the tort
of appropriation, 13 what Warren and Brandeis would have called
the right to prevent public portraiture, has thus all along lurched
4
precariously between formulations of privacy and of property.'
This ambiguous history calls into question precisely the
stakes in Warren and Brandeis's original attempt to distinguish
privacy from property. What difference, we might ask, does it
make whether the tort of appropriation is conceived as a property
rather than as a personal right? The answer, perhaps, lies in a
close rereading of Warren and Brandeis's pathbreaking work.
I.

PRIVACY AND PERSONALITY

A central claim of The Right to Privacy is that "[t]he princi11. Prosser, supra note 3, at 389. Prosser's distinctions were later adopted by the
second Restatement. See

OF TORTS § 652A (1976):
Section 652A. General Principle
(I) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in
§ 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in §
652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated
in § 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public, as stated in § 652E.
12. Prosser, supra note 3, at 389, 406. Following Prosser, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts notes that appropriation creates "a property right, for the exercise of which an
exclusive license may be given to a third person, which will entitle the licensee to maintain
an action to protect it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment a. For the
drafters of the second Restatement, this third party right of action constituted an important distinction between the appropriation branch of the tort and its three siblings. See id.
§ 6521 comment a.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C ("One who appropriates to his
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.").
14. For a discussion of this ambivalence, see Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207
(Miss. 1986). Compare Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 492-93, 113 P.2d 438,
446 (1941) (unnecessary to search for property right when determining whether defendant
invaded plaintiff's right to privacy by forging plaintiff's signature), with Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 387, 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1979) (appropriation
protects a property right in the publicity value of a person's identity).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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pie which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against
publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private
property, but that of an inviolate personality. 15 The equation of
privacy with "inviolate personality," however, occasions an important ambiguity in the article: What does it mean to violate
personality?
Warren and Brandeis offer two distinct lines of analysis, each
pointing toward a different conception of privacy. The first suggests what may be called a "descriptive" concept of privacy. The
Right to Privacy opens with a paean to the "eternal youth" of the
common law, which initially offered protection only to the physical body, but has since grown to recognize "man's spiritual nature, . . . his feelings and his intellect." 16 What the "general right
to privacy" ought now to safeguard, the article claims, are the
"[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations" that comprise personality
itself. 7 Borrowing from Thomas Cooley's description of the law's
extension to the physical body of "immunity from attacks and injuries,"1 8 Warren and Brandeis conceptualize this protection of
personality as "the right 'to be let alone.' "19
Warren and Brandeis analyze the common law copyright
cases by asking: "What is the thing which is protected?" 2 0 The
answer, at least according to one line of reasoning in the article, is
personality understood as an amalgam of empirically ascertainable states. To violate this personality is to disturb it, to cause it
"mental pain and distress."'" Just as the physical violation of the
body can be avoided by surrounding the body with a buffer of
unbreachable space, so the violation of personality can be prevented by surrounding the personality with a buffering space of
"solitude and privacy"" to insulate emotions and sensations from

15. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
16. Id. at 193.
17. Id. at 195, 206.
18. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 24 (1888).
19. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting T. COOLEY, supra note 18, at
29). Cooley writes: "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone. The corresponding duty is, not to inflict an injury, and not, within such
proximity as might render it successful, to attempt the infliction of an injury." T. COOLEY,
supra note 18, at 29.
20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 201.
21. Id. at 196.
22. Id.
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the world. 3
It follows for Warren and Brandeis that the common law
ought to secure "to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall
be communicated to others," whether these attributes of personality are "expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in
attitudes, or in facial expression. 12 4 I call this concept of privacy
"descriptive" because its application depends entirely upon ascertaining factual knowledge about the state of the world. The most
thoughtful analysis of descriptive privacy is by Ruth Gavison, who
suggests that it can be broken down into the "three independent
components" of "secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. ' 25 Privacy is
lost "as others obtain information about an individual, pay attention to him, or gain access to him."' 26 Warren and Brandeis's argument is that these objectively measurable dimensions of privacy
are so important that individuals ought legally to retain control
over them.
There is, however, a distinct line of analysis in The Right to
Privacy that points to a quite different conception of privacy,
which I shall call "normative." If one looks closely at the article's
description of the space that is supposed to buffer personality from
the world, the language is less that of empirical distance than of
moral characterization. Warren and Brandeis speak of the press
"overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency"; 27 they speak of privacy as rooted in "the respect
due to private life" and of the law only penalizing "the more flagrant breaches of decency and propriety"; 28 they conceptualize
privacy as establishing a "pale of propriety" whose boundaries can
only be fixed by taking "account of the varying circumstances of
29
each case."
So conceived, privacy does not refer to an objective physical
space of secrecy, solitude, or anonymity, but rather to the forms of
respect that we owe to each other as members of a common community. Personality is violated when these forms of respect are
transgressed. To speak of an invasion of privacy, therefore, is not
23. See id. at 205.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 198, 206.
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980).
Id.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 215.
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(merely) to describe factual propositions about the state of the
world; it is rather to characterize the legitimacy of actions by exercising what Georg Simmel calls "moral tact." 30 Privacy in this
sense is "normative" because it ultimately entails the articulation
and application of social norms.
Infringements of normative privacy rupture socialized expectations of respect and so can impair "the mental peace and comfort of the individual and may produce suffering much more acute
than that produced by mere bodily injury.""1 Hence by enforcing
norms of propriety the law affords protection to personality, although its object is not the elimination of painful sensations per
se. Moreover by enforcing norms of propriety the law also defines
and conserves the community instantiated by those norms, 2 a
concern that Warren and Brandeis considered of deep significance.33 Indeed, nothing in The Right to Privacy is now quite so
striking as the extraordinarily strict mugwump concept of commu34
nity that the article attempts to enunciate and enforce.
The concept of descriptive privacy is necessary for several
purposes, including functional and cross-cultural analyses. 5 But
the great weakness of descriptive privacy is that it contains no
account whatever of why its loss might cause damage to personality. 36 Mere exposure, understood as the transmission of measurable bits of information, or mere proximity, understood as the loss
of physical solitude, may or may not cause mental distress, de-

30. G. SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 324 (K. Wolff trans. & ed.
1950).
31. Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 363 (1915).
32. Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959-68, 976-78 (1989).
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
34. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875, 914-18 (1979)
("Warren and Brandeis were ... struggling to defend a traditional, narrow, 'patrician'
perception of what was 'news,' what was of public interest and therefore publishable.").

35. See Post, supra note 32, at 969-70.
36. There are, of course, functional accounts of why a certain degree of descriptive
privacy might be necessary for a healthy personality. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 25, at
442-44. But these accounts do not purport to contend that descriptive privacy is necessary
per se. Indeed Gavison begins her functional account with:
the obvious [premise] that both perfect privacy and total loss of privacy are
undesirable. Individuals must be in some intermediate state-a balance between
privacy and interaction-in order to maintain human relations, develop their capacities and sensibilities, create and grow, and even to survive. Privacy thus cannot be said to be a value in the sense that the more people have of it, the better.
Id. at 440.
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pending upon the circumstances. s7 Normative privacy, on the
other hand, lends itself to a straightforward account of why a person socialized to certain forms of respect would experience harm
when those forms of respect are disregarded. 38 Despite this important difference, The Right to Privacy is pervasively equivocal as

between normative and descriptive privacy.
As matters later developed, the intrusion s" and public disclosure4" branches of the privacy tort came to depend entirely upon
normative rather than descriptive conceptions of privacy.41 It
quickly became evident that these branches of the tort could be
given coherent legal formulation only by reference to the normative judgments of the "reasonable person."'42 But the tort of appro-

priation has remained somewhat apart, ambiguous like the Warren and Brandeis article as between descriptive and normative
conceptions of privacy. 43 The question I want to address is why
this is so, and whether, to disclose the direction of my argument,
it is connected to the concomitant fact that appropriation also re-

mains of all the branches of the privacy tort uniquely undifferentiated from concepts of property.

37. Post, supra note 32, at 969-74.
38. Id. at 962-63; cf. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 601, 616-24 (1990) (regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976):
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
40. Id. § 652D:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is
of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
41. See Post, supra note 32, at 959-74, 978-87.
42. See supra notes 39-40. The false light branch of the tort also invokes the reasonable person standard. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
43. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939) (applying a reasonable person
standard) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (defining appropriation tort in
terms of property rather than the reasonable person standard). Compare Bitsie v. Walston,
85 N.M. 65, 515 P.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1973) (liability requires finding of offensiveness to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities), and Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz.
294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945) (applying reasonable person standard), with Canessa v. J.1. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 357, 235 A.2d 62, 79 (1967) (" 'ordinary sensibilities' test is
irrelevant to . . . 'appropriation' case[s]"), and Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C.
780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (propriety of injunctive relief for appropriation is determined
without regard to offensiveness or ordinary sensibilities).
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COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT, PROPERTY, AND PERSONALITY

We are returned, therefore, to the central enterprise of The

Right to Privacy, which is to argue that "legal doctrines relating
to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the common-law right
to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general right to privacy .

. . ."

At

the time Warren and Brandeis were writing, statutory copyright
consisted of legislative protection extended to literary and artistic
works upon their publication. The common law, however, afforded
protection to literary and artistic works before their publication.45
This protection was conceived as a property right, and it empowered authors and artists to prevent unauthorized publication of
their unpublished works. Warren and Brandeis sought to conclude
from this that the "common law secures to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others."4 "
What stood in the way of this conclusion was that common
law copyright, as it was generally understood, extended its protection not to "thoughts, sentiments, and emotions," 47 but to specific
literary or artistic work, whether in the form of manuscripts, letters, diaries, or engravings. Protection was extended to this work
on the principle that "[a] production of mind is property in every
essential sense in which a production of hands is the producer's
property."48 The entire structure of common law copyright was
thus oriented toward the protection of "distinguishable evidence of
'49
intellectual effort."
This orientation served both to define the thing that would
receive legal protection and to supply the justification for that protection. The "sole foundation" of common law copyright was "the
right which every man has to the exclusive possession and control

44. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
45. See 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 15.4-15.6
(1989); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 (1978 & Supp. 1990); Strauss,
Protection of Unpublished Works (1957), reprinted in Study No. 29, COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961).
46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
47. Id.
48. Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 485 (1867).
49. Pratt, The Warren and BrandeisArgument for a Right to Privacy, 1975 PuB. L.
161, 174.
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of the products of his own labor. ' 50 Because they desired to construct a right of privacy that extended protection to an entire inviolate personality and not just to its products, Warren and Brandeis believed that they were forced to dismantle the property law
structure of common law copyright.
A. The Argument from Authority
The bulk 6f their effort to do this, when measured by length
of argumentation, is not today of any great interest, for it rests
upon a strained and historically sterile reading of a single decision, Prince Albert v. Strange.5 1 In that remarkable case, William
Strange had somehow managed to obtain etchings that Queen
Victoria and Prince Albert had executed for their own private
amusement, and was threatening to exhibit them together with a
"Descriptive Catalogue," evidently with the purpose "of being, in
common language, 'bought off.' ",52 Prince Albert sought an injunction prohibiting the exhibition and ordering the destruction of
the Catalogue. The injunction was ultimately granted by Lord
Chancellor Cottenham, who viewed the case as falling so clearly
"within established principles, that the application of them is not
' 53
attended with any difficulty.
One of these principles, not relevant here, was that the etchings were obtained through "a breach of trust, confidence, or contract" and that therefore their exhibition, together with the publication of the Catalogue, could be enjoined. 54 Later decisions have
in fact read Strange to rest on the principle that the publication of
unpublished works obtained through breach of "a confidential relation" can be enjoined, as well as "any communication of their

50. Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). Protection was most
definitely not extended on the general ground of preventing the violation of important social norms:
A court of equity is not the general guardian of the morals of society. It has not
an unlimited authority to enforce the performance or prevent the violation of
every moral duty. It would be extravagant to say that it may restrain, by an
injunction, the perpetration of every act which it may judge to be corrupt in its

motives, or demoralizing, or dangerous in its tendency.
Id. at 54; see Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 426, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 678 (1818).
51. 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (V.C. 1848), affid, I Mac & G. 25, 41
Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch. 1849).
52. Id. at 688, 64 Eng. Rep. at 308.
53. 1 Mac & G. 25, 40, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1177 (Ch. 1849).
54. Id. at 44, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1178-79.
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contents to third persons. '55
More relevant for Warren and Brandeis's argument was the
principle that the etchings were the property of Prince Albert and
Queen Victoria, and that the royal couple possessed, therefore,
"the right to prevent the exhibition or publication of any copies of
them .... -5" This principle formed the basis for much of the
reasoning in the Strange opinion. The question posed by Warren
and Brandeis was why the principle justified prohibiting Strange
from publishing his Catalogue of the etchings. To this question
Cottingham had a prosaic but defensible answer:
It being admitted that the Defendant could not publish a copy,
that is an impression, of the etching, how in principle does a
catalogue, list, or description differ? A copy or impression of the
etching would only be a means of communicating knowledge
and information of the original, and does not a list and description do the same? The means are different, but the object and
effect are similar; for, in both, the object and effect is to make
known to the public more or less of the unpublished work and
composition of the author, which he is entitled to keep wholly
for his private use and pleasure, and to withhold altogether, or
57
so far as he may please, from the knowledge of others.
The point was that Strange's "Descriptive Catalogue" actually
conveyed the content of the etchings, and so pro tanto could be
enjoined as a publication of them.
In his opinion below, however, Vice Chancellor J. L. Knight
Bruce had speculated in dicta that the publication of a mere list of
the etchings could also have been enjoined:
Property in mechanical works or works of art, executed by a
man for his own amusement, instruction or use, is allowed to
subsist certainly, and may, before publication by him, be invaded, not merely by copying, but by description or by catalogue, as it appears to me. A catalogue of such works may in
itself be valuable. It may also as effectually shew the bent and
turn of the mind, the feelings and taste of the artist, especially if
not professional, as a list of his papers. The portfolio or the studio may declare as much as the writing-table. A man may employ himself in private in a manner very harmless, but which,
disclosed to society, may destroy the comfort of his life, or even

55.
56.
57.

Philip v. Pennell, 2 Ch. 577, 586-87 (1907).
Prince Albert, 1 Mac & G. at 43, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1178.
Id. at 43, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1178.

1991]

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

his success in it. 58
This language was very helpful to Warren and Brandeis, for it
began to move away from a narrow emphasis on the specific results of intellectual effort, and toward a general focus on personality itself. This shift pervaded Bruce's approach to the case. At
another point in his opinion he argued that "[b]y publishing of a
man that he has written to particular persons, or on particular
subjects, he may be exposed, not merely to sarcasm, he may be
ruined," and that therefore Bruce hoped and believed that the law
would enjoin the publication of "a mere list of.

.

.manuscripts,

without authority or consent." 59
Warren and Brandeis made the most out of Bruce's evident
concern with protecting private activities. They properly observed
that under the circumstances of Bruce's hypothetical an injunction
against a mere list could not "rest upon the right to literary or
artistic property in any exact sense,"60 and that
[I]t is difficult to perceive.

. .

why, if such a publication would

be restrained when it threatened to expose the victim not merely
to sarcasm, but to ruin, it should not equally be enjoined, if it
threatened to embitter his life. .

.

.If the fiction of property in

a narrow sense must be preserved, it is still true that the end
accomplished by the gossip-monger is attained by the use of that
which is another's, the facts relating to his private life, which he
has seen fit to keep private ...
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists
in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let
alone.61
The difficulty with this line of analysis, however, is that the more
generous implications of Bruce's approach both badly misstated
precedential authority and were in the end seriously beside the
hard legal point of his decision. Professor Pratt has shown, for
example, that "[n]ewspapers which reported the Prince Albert
case included a list of the etchings; the decision did not prohibit
the publication of a list, it prohibited the publication of a descrip-

58.
59.
60.
61.

2 De G. & Si. at 696-97, 64 Eng. Rep. at 312.
Id. at 693-94, 64 Eng. Rep. at 311.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 202.
Id. at 204-05.
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tion which, according to the Lord Chancellor, would have the
same effect as publication of a copy."62
Following Cottingham's reasoning, no English case has interpreted Strange in the manner advocated by Warren and Brandeis.6 3 And even Brandeis himself appears later to have abandoned any pretension that common law copyright could be given
the interpretation he and Warren had advocated in their article.
In his well-known dissent in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,64 he wrote that cases involving
the common-law right of the producer to prohibit copying...
rest upon the ground that the common law recognizes such productions as property which, despite restricted communication,
continues until there is a dedication to the public under the
copyright statutes or otherwise. . . .At common law . . . intellectual productions are entitled to such protection only if there is
underneath something evincing the mind of a creator or originator, however modest the requirement. The mere record of isolated happenings, whether in words or by photographs not involving artistic skill, are denied such protection. . . . At
common law . . . the element in intellectual productions which
secures such protection is not the knowledge, truths, ideas, or
emotions which the composition expresses, but the form or sequence in which they are expressed; that is, "some new collocation of visible or audible points,-of lines, colors, sounds, or
words." . . . An author's theories, suggestions, and speculations
• . .derive no such protection ....
B.

The Argument from Personality

The argument from authority was important to Warren and
Brandeis because they were concerned to cast the right to privacy
as a mere extension of existing common law principles and so
avoid the charge of "judicial legislation." 6 6 That concern is of less
importance today, and so their failure to establish precedential
support is at most of historical interest. What is more significant
to our own efforts to assess the significance of the revolution

62. Pratt, supra note 49, at 172-73 (footnote omitted).
63. The influence of Warren and Brandeis's misreading of Strange nevertheless persists in American legal scholarship. See, e.g., Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection
of Privacy, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 459, 464 (1988).
64. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
65. Id. at 253-55 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
66. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213 n.l.
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659

wrought by The Right to Privacy is the analytic relationship of
privacy to property. And on this issue Warren and Brandeis's discussion is considerably less developed. Their article does, however,
contain the seeds of an important argument that deeply illuminates the nature of common law copyright.
The accepted rationale for common law copyright lay in the
concept of "labor. ' 67 Legal decisions explained the purpose of
copyright as the protection of intellectual effort:
It is generally recognized that one has a right to the fruits of his
labor. This is equally true, whether the work be muscular or
mental or both combined. Property in literary productions,
before publication and while they rest in manuscript, is as plain
as property in the game of the hunter or in the grain of the
husbandman. 8
This explanation, of course, makes perfect sense in the context of
the conscious creation of a literary work, where the labor involved
is obvious. But the explanation is puzzling when applied to the
composition of a casual letter or diary entry, which were also protected by common law copyright.6 9
With regard to such compositions, the accepted rationale for
common law copyright began to falter. "The labor of composing
letters for private and familiar correspondence may be trifling, or
it may be severe, but it is none the less the result of an expenditure of thought and time. ' 70 This explanation prompted Warren
and Brandeis to a penetrating inquiry. Why, they asked, is the
machinery of property routinely wheeled out to protect the "trifling" labor involved in correspondence, when it is denied to the
greater "expenditure of thought and time" necessitated by the living of life itself:
It may be urged that a distinction should be taken between
the deliberate expression of thoughts and emotions in literary or
artistic compositions and the casual and often involuntary expression given to them in the ordinary conduct of life. In other
words, it may be contended that the protection afforded is

67. See generally E. DRONE. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 1-53 (1879) (discussing the origins of literary property).
68. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 604, 97 N.E. 109, I11 (1912).
69. Warren and Brandeis correctly note that the protection afforded by common law
copyright to an unpublished writing is "entirely independent of its pecuniary value, its
intrinsic merits, or of any intention to publish the same." Warren & Brandeis, supra note
1,at 204.
70. Baker, 210 Mass. at 604, 97 N.E. at 111.
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granted to the conscious products of labor, perhaps as an encouragement to effort. This contention, however plausible, has,
in fact, little to recommend it. If the amount of labor involved
be adopted as the test, we might well find that the effort to conduct one's self properly in business and in domestic relations had
been far greater than that involved in painting a picture or writing a book; one would find that it was far easier to express lofty
sentiments in a diary than in the conduct of a noble life. If the
test of deliberateness of the act be adopted, much casual correspondence which is now accorded full protection would be excluded from the beneficent operation of existing rules. After the
decisions denying the distinction attempted to be made between
those literary productions which it was intended to publish and
those which it was not, all considerations of the amount of labor
involved, the degree of deliberation, the value of the product,
and the intention of publishing must be abandoned, and no basis
is discerned upon which the right to restrain publication and reproduction of such so-called literary and artistic works can be
rested, except the right to privacy, as part of the more general
right to the immunity of the person,-the right to one's
personality.71
In this crucial passage Warren and Brandeis begin to uncover the
disparity between the accepted "labor" justification for common
law copyright and the actual shape of the law.
In fact when pressed upon the exact nature of the labor involved in intellectual production, the common law was apt to
speak, instead of "originality" as the true grounds of "the title of
the property. If a person claims to be the owner of an intellectual
production, on the ground that it is the creation of his own mind,
it is obvious that his title will fail when there is an entire absence
,,7 And the common law was prepared to conof originality ..
cede that originality was less a matter of intellectual effort than of
expressing "the mind of a creator or originator," as Brandeis well
knew.7 3 Hence Mr. Justice Erle in Jefferys v. Boosey 4 noted:
"..

The origin of property is in production. As to works of imagination and reasoning, if not of memory, the author may be said to

71. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 206-07 (footnote omitted).
72. E. DRONE, supra note 67, at 110. For an example of the persistence of this focus
on originality, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282
(1991).
73. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 254 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. 4 H.L. Cas. 814, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
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create, and, in all departments of mind, new books are the product of the labour, skill, and capital of the author. The subject of
property is the order of words in the author's composition; not
the words themselves, they being analogous to the elements of
matter, which are not appropriated unless combined, nor the
ideas expressed by those words, they existing in the mind alone,
which is not capable of appropriation ...
.. .[T]he claim is not to ideas, but to the order of words,
and

.

.

this order has a marked identity and a permanent en-

durance. Not only are the words chosen by a superior mind peculiar to itself, but in ordinary life no two descriptions of the
same fact will be in the same words . .

.

.The order of each

man's words is as singular as his countenance, and although if
two authors composed originally with the same order of words,
each would have a property therein, still the probability of such
an occurrence is less than that there should be two countenances
that could not be discriminated. 75
The common law did not protect ideas, even though ideas
were obviously the result of intellectual labor.70 It instead protected the original expression of ideas.77 The concept of "labor"
thus modulated into the concept of "creation," and the' sign of
creation was the communication of "a marked identity." And it is
for that reason that even casual letters were protected, "for they
consist of the thoughts and language of the writer reduced to written characters, and show his style and his mode of constructing
sentences, and his habits of composition. ' 78 But the logical conclusion of this reasoning, as Oliver Wendell Holmes understood with
his usual clarity, was that the object of the law's solicitation was

75. Id. at 867, 869, 10 Eng. Rep. at 702-03.
76. See, e.g., Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F.2d 529, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Desny v.
Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 731-33, 299 P.2d 257, 265-66 (1956); Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N.J.
Eq. 575, 578-79, 64 A. 436, 437-38 (1906).
77. As the Supreme Court of the United States has said, in words addressed to statutory copyright, but which are equally applicable to common law copyright:
Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed;
protection is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself. ...
The distinction is illustrated in FredFisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151,
when the court speaks of two men, each a perfectionist, independently making
maps of the same territory. Though the maps are identical, each may obtain the
exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will
infringe the other's copyright. . . . The copyright protects originality rather
than novelty or invention-conferring only "the sole right of multiplying copies."
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
78. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
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nothing less than "personality" itself: "The copy is the personal
reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting,
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible,
which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright
"79

Warren and Brandeis were thus quite right to move from labor to "the right to one's personality," for in a variety of contexts
common law copyright was at root concerned to protect "the objectification of a personality." 8 And in the years after The Right
to Privacy, as Warren and Brandeis might have predicted, common law copyright would even contemplate safeguarding objectifications of personality that were not fixed in the "tangible form" of
letters or etchings; but were instead merely manifested during the
flow of private "conversational speech." 8 1

III.

PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND PERSONALITY

It does not follow, however, that Warren and Brandeis were
correct that common law copyright had all along been unconsciously protecting privacy. The Right to Privacy brilliantly demonstrates that the language of property is not irresistibly thrust
upon common law copyright by the object of its protection. Despite the rhetoric of common law judges and commentators, Warren and Brandeis understood that there was nothing in the intrinsic nature of letters or etchings that made them property. If
anything the causal arrow was reversed: letters were conceptualized as property because the common law chose to objectify the
aspects of personality they embodied.
Warren and Brandeis evidently believed that once common
law copyright was forced to recognize its roots in personality, it
would necessarily shift its foundation from property to privacy.
But this was a non sequitur, caused by the failure fully to appreciate what might be called the independence of legal characterization. The law can commodify personality as property, or it can
79. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). The relationship of Holmes's formulation in Bleistein to that of Warren and Brandeis in The Right
to Privacy has not gone unnoticed. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT
35 n.93 (1967).
80. Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of
Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONs 51, 75 (1983).

81. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 345-48, 244
N.E.2d 250, 253-55, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 776-78 (1968).
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instead protect emotional integrity through tort actions analogous
to those of defamation: The choice depends upon reasons of policy,
not upon the intrinsic nature of personality itself. The fundamental issue, therefore, is not whether the law ought to protect person-

ality, but rather how the law ought to conceptualize personality
for purposes of legal protection.
A. Property Rights and Personal Rights
There has been much fine work recently on the "disintegra' Yet in attempting to extricate privacy from
tion of property."82
property, Warren and Brandeis were working within well-defined
legal traditions that persist to this day. They were advocating that
privacy be embodied within a regime of personal rather than
property rights. What this meant can best be made visible by contrasting the legal characteristics of common law copyright with
those of the kind of personal tort action that Warren and Brandeis
were proposing.
The property right protected by common law copyright, reflecting its origins in the order of the market, was clearly alienable. It could be assigned, sold, or otherwise transferred. 83 Personal
rights embracing "torts to the person or character where the injury and damage are confined to the body and the feelings," on
the other hand, were not assignable.84 Warren and Brandeis could
therefore anticipate that their proposed right of privacy would be
nonalienable, attached to specific injured individuals. That is in
fact the current state of the law.85 "It is well settled that the right
of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded, that is,
plaintiff must plead and prove that his privacy has been invaded."'8 6 Personal tort actions for privacy cannot ordinarily be

82. See, e.g., Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in PROPERTY, NOMoS XXII 69,
69-85 (1980).
83. E. DRONE, supra note 67, at 104-06.
84. 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1275 (3d ed. 1905);
see Ware v. Brown, 29 F. Cas. 220 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1869) (No. 17,170); J. TOWNSHEND, A
TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL § 299 (4th ed. 1890).
85. See, e.g., K.L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAW 187 (1988).
86. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 821, 603 P.2d 425, 430, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 328 (1979) (emphasis in original) (quoting, with insignificant error, Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62, 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431
(1975)). Thus privacy rights may be waived, but not sold or transferred.
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sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred to others.8 7
Just as the property right protected by common law copyright
could be alienated from its owner, so could it also survive its
owner's death."8 Common law copyright was thought to endure

forever; 89 it could be devised by will or descend through intestate
succession." Conversely, the personal privacy right advocated by
Warren and Brandeis could be expected to follow the general rule
"actio personalis moritur cum persona, or the right of action for
tort is put an end to by the death of either party." 91 To this day,

privacy actions, in the absence of statutory intervention, "can be
maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded,"
and are therefore neither devisable nor descendible. 92 A personal
right to privacy "dies with the person." 93

Warren and Brandeis were undoubtedly aware of other important technical differences that followed from the legal characterization of their proposed privacy right. 94 But the distinction

87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 comment a (1976); Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 209 (1954). Reflecting the ambiguous state of the appropriation tort, midway between a personal and a property right, the
second Restatement remarks that "the only exception" to the "rule" against the assignability of an action for invasion of privacy "involves the appropriation to the defendant's own
use of another's name or likeness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 comment a.
88. This was connected to the broader principle that "the test of survivorship of a
cause of action is its assignability, and conversely, the test of assignability is survivorship-that is to say that they are always concomitant." Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462,
466, 130 P. 743, 745 (1913); see 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 84, at § 1275.
89. E. DRONE, supra note 67, at 100; Newman, supra note 63, at 463; Note, Copyright and Privacy Protection of Unpublished Works-The Author's Dilemma, 13 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 351, 359 (1977). Considerations of policy, however, were understood to
warrant temporal limitations on property rights, and in fact were thought to justify the
restricted duration of statutory copyright protections. Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology
and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
110, 114-29 (1990); Note, supra at 367-69; cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (West Supp.
1991) (limiting time for bringing suit for unauthorized use of a deceased personality's
name or likeness to 50 years after the personality's death).
90. Note, Personal Letters: In Need of a Law of their Own, 44 IOWA L. REV. 705,
710 (1959).
91. F. POLLOCK. THE LAW OF TORTS 40 (1887); see J. TOWNSHEND, supra note 84,
§ 299.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1976); see Bluer, California Extends
The Right of Publicity to Heirs: A Shift from Privacy to Property and Copyright Principles, 7 COMM/ENT L.J. 575, 578 (1984); Gordon, supra note 2, at 612-13.
93. Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 429, 431 (1975); see Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983),
afl'd, 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. For example, property rights clearly could be protected by injunction, and hence
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they were most concerned to press involved the question of damages. Damages available to a plaintiff for invasions of personality,
conceptualized through the lens of the property right of common
law copyright, were measured by market tests of unjust enrichment or lost profits.9 5 By reconceptualizing personality in terms of
emotional integrity, Warren and Brandeis desired to make damages available instead for distress and anguish. They thus advocated that damages be seen as compensation for "the value of
' At the time
mental suffering." 96
they were writing, the common

injunctive relief was, and remains, a standard remedy for infringement of common law
copyright. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1987); E. DRONE,
supra note 67, at 107; 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 45, §§ 11.0-1 1.2; 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 45, at § 14.06; cf. Newman, supra note 63, at 464. It was considerably less certain
whether injunctive relief would be available to protect the kind of personal privacy right
advocated by Warren and Brandeis. Id. Warren and Brandeis evince uncertainty on this
point, noting that an injunction might be available "in perhaps a very limited class of
cases." Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 219. In a footnote, Warren and Brandeis cite
two authors, both of whom remark on the unsettled state of the law, but both of whom
nevertheless conclude that the majority rule is that injunctions are "limited to the protection of property rights" and that "courts of equity would not restrain the publications of
libels or works of a libelous nature." 2 J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS
§ 1015 (4th ed. 1905); see also J. TOWNSHEND, supra note 83, at § 417a. For other common law differences between personal and property rights, see Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc.,
97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967) (differences in statute of limitations); Ettore v.
Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 489 (3d Cir. 1956) (differences with
respect to choice of law).
An important contemporary difference between conceptualizing privacy as a personal
rather than as a property right concerns constitutional law. It is fair to say that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment has been hostile to restrictions on
speech that arise from protecting the personal privacy of the person. See, e.g., Florida Star
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). But see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
But the Court has been considerably more sympathetic to restrictions on speech that are
justified in terms of the protection of a personality that has been conceptualized as property. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-79 (1977); cf. Interna-,
tional News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). This difference also obtains in
the area of defamation. See Post, The Social Foundationsof Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691, 726-39 (1986). So, for example, the routine
injunction against communication that would ordinarily be regarded as a highly disfavored
prior restraint is routinely tolerated when applied to speech that has been commodified as
property. See In re Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 918 F.2d 140 (1 1th Cir. 1990); New Era
Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (Ist Cir. 1986). This constitutional disparity
as even noticeable at the time of Warren and Brandeis. See J. TOWNSHEND, supra note
84, at § 417a.
95. E. DRONE, supra note 67, at 107, 114-15, 486, 535.
96. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213. For a description of other social functions served by the remedy of damages in the context of the personal tort, see Post, supra
note 32, at 964-68.
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law, although generally ambivalent or even hostile to such damages, 97 was nevertheless willing to award them in those tortious

situations like assault or false imprisonment where the dignity or
honor of the personality was believed to be directly at stake. 98
Warren and Brandeis's achievement in making such damages the
centerpiece for the new privacy tort9 " essentially depended upon

their success in demonstrating that privacy was necessary for the
integrity of personality.
The fundamental legal reconceptualization involved in the
shift from the property right of common law copyright to the personal right of privacy is dramatically evident in the recent emergence of the tort dubbed by Jerome Frank in 1953 as the "right of
publicity."'100 Growing out of the appropriation tort, 10 or, in the
eyes of some courts, substituting for the appropriation tort, 0 2 the
right of publicity was designed as a property right that would

safeguard the goodwill created by celebrities in their public persona. 10 3 The obvious value of these persona, as well as the apparent labor involved in their establishment, led courts to devise a
property right that would enable a celebrity to control "the commercial value in his identity."' 0 4 "The distinctive aspect of the

common law right of publicity is that it recognizes the commercial
value of the picture or representation of a prominent person or

performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability

97. See, e.g., Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S.E. 901 (1892)
(mental distress damages allowable as an item of damages but cannot be the sole item of
damages); J. DEERING, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 416 (1886) ("[M]ere mental anxiety
. . .unaccompanied by personal injury is not the subject of damages.").
98. See Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51, 58 (1878); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss.
703, 710, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
99. See Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 378, 151 S.E.2d 496, 504 (1966);
Gordon, supra note 2, at 610-11; Nimmer, supra note 87, at 216.
100. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953).
101. See Tennessee ex. rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Fund v. Crowell, 733
S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tenn. App. 1987).
102. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978).
103. Carson, 698 F.2d at 834 ("The right of publicity has developed to protect the
commercial interest of celebrities in their identities.").
104. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 839, 603 P.2d 425, 441, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 339 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); see Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.
Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) ("It is this court's view that a celebrity has a legitimate
proprietary interest in his public personality."); Bloom, Preventing the Misappropriation of
Identity: Beyond the "Right of Publicity" 13 COMM/ENT L.J. 489, 491 (1991).
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of his public reputation or 'persona.' "o105
The process of distinguishing publicity from privacy rights
was protracted and confused,10 6 but in the end the right of publicity has generally assumed the very characteristics of common law
copyright from which Warren and Brandeis sought to differentiate
the personal right of privacy. Actions to enforce rights of publicity
are freely transferrable and alienable, 0 7 and potentially devisable
by will or descendible through intestate succession.' 0 8 Moreover
the "key feature distinguishing the Right of Publicity" from the
personal right to privacy is the "measure of damage," which for
the former "focuses upon the commercial injury to the plaintiff"
instead of upon indignity and mental distress. 0 9 "[T]he right of
publicity," in short, "does not differ in kind from copyright."" 0
B.

Privacy and Property

Having acquired some appreciation of the actual operational
significance of Warren and Brandeis's argument, we are now in a
position to inquire why they were concerned to embody personality within a regime of personal rather than property rights. What
exactly is at stake in the distinction between privacy and
property?
At the most general level, the property created by common
law copyright and the right to publicity transforms personality
into a thing or an object"' whose value is to be determined by

105. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
106. See generally J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1987)
(detailing the history of the distinction between the rights of publicity and privacy).
107. Id. § l0.3[B][11-[2].
108. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 106, §§ 9.2-9.5. Rights of publicity will also be protected by injunction. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978); J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 106, § 11.6. Moreover, the right of publicity is clearly viewed by
the Supreme Court as more compatible with first amendment principles than privacy rights
based upon nonproprietary characterizations of personality. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). The Court views the state's interest in the
protection of the right to publicity as "analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law,
focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little
to do with protecting feelings or reputation." Id.
109. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 106, § 11.8.
110. Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 679
(7th Cir. 1986).
Ill. Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 327

(1985).
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reference to the institution of the market. Hence personality is
commodified and becomes "something in the outside world, separate from oneself." 11 For this reason, commodified personality
can endure long beyond the living self of the individual who creates it, and it can also be owned and used by persons other than
its creator. The self of the actual "creator or originator""' of
commodified personality is merely of marginal consideration, pertinent only to the achievement of the underlying legal policy of
the "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain.",1a4 And
because the law must accurately ascertain the boundaries of the
thing exchanged among persons, commodified personality must itself be legally apprehended in terms capable of objective measurement. So, for example, common law copyright locates commodifled personality in the physical "order of words,"" 5 a formulation
compatible with requirements of descriptive privacy.
The personal right of privacy advocated by Warren and
Brandeis, on the other hand, attaches personality firmly to the actual identity of a living individual." 6 The right cannot be transferred; it is temporally bound to the life of a particular person.
The purpose of the right is to facilitate the flourishing of that life,
and the right therefore presupposes both a normative theory of
human personality and an account of the relationship between
that theory and the exercise of legal rights." 7 This explains the
dependence of the personal right of privacy upon normative rather
than descriptive privacy, for only the former meets these
prerequisites.""
This dependence means that the personal right of privacy,
like normative privacy, conceives the identities of particular per-

112. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 966 (1982).
113. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 254 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
114. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953); see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1976).
115. Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L. Cas. 814, 869, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 703 (1854).
116. It is no accident that Warren and Brandeis were writing at a time when American popular culture was coming to stress the idea of "personality" as "self-realization,"

embodying "the unique qualities of the individual." W. SUSMAN.

CULTURE AS HISTORY

(1984). For an illuminating discussion of antebellum concepts of personality, see R.

281

RABI-

NOWITZ, THE SPIRITUAL SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONAL

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND

153-216 (1989).

117. See Post, supra note 32, at 964-68, 985-86 (discussing the relationship between
the normative theory of human identity presupposed by the privacy tort and damages for
indignity and mental distress).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
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sons as dependent upon the observance of social norms of respect.
The function of the law is to uphold those norms. In contrast the

commodified personality recognized by common law copyright and
the right of publicity is not conceptualized as constitutive of the

identities of particular persons, but as detachable from them.
Commodified personality is "separate from the person and possessed by the person," from which vantage point the person re-

cedes into an abstract and undifferentiated capacity to exercise
"individual effort" to generate other and distinct commodifiable
personalities. 1 9 The function of the law is to sustain that capacity.
At issue in the distinction between privacy and property,

therefore, is the legal conception of the person. The question is
whether the law ought to construct its doctrine on the presupposi-

tion that identity is essentially embedded within and dependent
upon particular social arrangements, or rather on the presupposition that identity most importantly resides in the capacity to create itself anew.

Of course any reasonably sophisticated sociological or psychological account of the self would acknowledge the existence
and necessity of both these aspects of identity-embeddedness and
independence. Personality can so effortlessly be legally embodied
by either property or privacy rights precisely because it embraces

119. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1897 (1987). This distinction helps to explain why first amendment doctrine regards the enforcement of personal
privacy rights with special hostility, for such rights necessarily entail legal protection for a
particular vision of community life, which is inconsistent with the purpose of public discourse to serve as a neutral "marketplace of communities." Post, supra note 38, at 632.
The inexhaustible capacity for regeneration presupposed by property rights, on the other
hand, is not theoretically incompatible with the premises of public discourse, and is in fact
roughly homologous to the individualism and "radical negativity" that characterizes the
constitutional concept of that discourse. See id. at 626-44; Post, supra note 94, at 716. In
particular circumstances, however, the operation of property rights may seriously interfere
with the practical functioning of public discourse. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F.
Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), afd, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25
Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring); Paulsen v.
Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Bloom,
supra note 104, at 528.
I have no particularly cogent explanation as to why property rights, as distinguished
from personal rights, routinely receive injunctive protection. I would only observe that restraining equitable enforcement of personal rights might have served the same policy as
Fox's Libel Act, 32 Geo. 3, ch. 660 (1792), which ensured that juries, as distinguished
from the King's judges, would be given the power to interpret community norms. For a

discussion of Fox's Libel Act, see Z. CHAFEE. FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 504-06
(1941), and T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 99 (1970).
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both these aspects. The question, therefore, is not which aspect of
identity ought to be encouraged and which suppressed; it is rather
the circumstances under which the law ought to lend its weight to
one aspect of the self or the other. This conclusion may seem
bland, but it will, I hope, help to illuminate what is at stake in
some of the uncertainties that have unceasingly plagued the tort
of appropriation.
IV.

THE TORT OF APPROPRIATION

The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of appropriation in the following way:
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy. 20
The definition appears to evoke descriptive rather than normative
privacy, for a plaintiff's case can be established merely by proving
facts about the state of the world. The plaintiff can recover damages for mental distress if his or her name or likeness has been
"appropriated" to a defendant's own "use or benefit." But if we
ask why this should be so, we immediately run into ambiguities.
A. The Present Condition of the Tort
There are two possible explanations for the present shape of
the tort. The first, advanced by the late Edward Bloustein, is that
"the commercialization of personality" is a "personal affront" that
is "demeaning to human dignity."' 21 Because appropriation intrin122
sically causes "mortification, humiliation and degradation,"'
plaintiffs ought to have personal privacy rights enabling them to
sue for mental distress.
This explanation of the tort has a long pedigree and was in
fact the rationale of Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.,' 2 ' which is generally acknowledged to be the first major decision recognizing the privacy tort advocated by Warren and Brandeis. 24 The plaintiff in Pavesich, a private individual, sued an in120.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652C (1976).

121. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 987 (1964).
122. Id.
123. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
124. The author of the Pavesich opinion, Judge Andrew Jackson Cobb, sent a copy
of the decision to Brandeis, along with "very kind expressions." I L. BRANDEIS. THE LET-
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surance company for the unauthorized use of his picture in an
advertisement for life insurance. The Georgia Supreme Court
ruled that the defendant had violated the plaintiff's right to
privacy:
The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature. . . . Each individual as [sic] instinctively resents any encroachment by the public upon his rights which are of a private
nature ....
It therefore follows . . . that a violation of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the individual. It is a
tort, and it is not necessary that special damages should have
accrued from its violation in order to entitle the aggrieved party
to recover...
• . . There is in the publication of one's picture for advertising purposes not the slightest semblance of an expression of an
idea, a thought, or an opinion ..... The knowledge that one's
features and form are being used for such a purpose, and displayed in such places as such advertisements are often liable to
be found, brings . . . the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a
realization that his liberty has been taken away from him; and,
as long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot
be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time
being under the control of another, that he is no longer free, and
that he is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to
service by a merciless master; and if a man of true instincts, or
even of ordinary sensibilities, no one can be more conscious of
his enthrallment than he is.125
The passage plainly evokes normative privacy. It conceives commercial appropriation of a person's image as violative of essential
norms of respect and hence as destructive of personality.
The difficulty with this explanation of the appropriation tort,
however, is that the elements of the tort are phrased in terms of
descriptive privacy, which serves as a rather poor proxy for normative concerns. There are circumstances in which a defendant's
appropriation of an image for "his own use or benefit" would not
be an affront, as for example in a Cartier-Bresson candid photo-

TERS OF

Louis D.

BRANDEIS

303-04 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1971). Brandeis said of

the opinion that he was "pleased . . . to find that the right to Privacy is at last finding
judicial recognition." Id. at 306.
125. Pavesich, 112 Ga. at 194, 201-02, 219-20, 50 S.E. at 69, 73, 80.
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graph or a news photographer's rendition of a significant happening. Sometimes the use of a plaintiffs image is degrading not because it has been appropriated to a defendant's benefit, but rather
because of the specific way in which it has been used. For example
in Bitsie v. Walston 2 ' the parents of a Navajo child consented to
her being photographed, but objected when the photograph was
displayed on a note card sold to benefit the Cerebral Palsy Fund.
They did not find demeaning the appropriation of the child's image, but rather experienced its association with disease as a devas1 27
tating harbinger of "bad luck.1
Sometimes, moreover, even the unauthorized commercial use
of another's image could not reasonably be deemed to affront
human dignity. In Canessa v. J.L Kislak, Inc.,1 28 for example, a
family with eight children could not find an apartment or house to
rent. In frustration they ran an advertisement in the "Lost and
Found" section of the local newspaper. A local real estate firm
answered the ad and assisted the family in purchasing a house.
The local paper published a human interest story on the circumstances, which included a posed picture of the family. The real
estate firm reprinted the article, stamped it with their "commercial trademark," and distributed it "without doubt for advertising
purposes in advancement of . . . commercial interests. 1 129 Although the simple dissemination of the newspaper article was not
itself actionable, 3 0 the court concluded that by converting the article into an advertisement the real estate firm had committed the
tort of appropriation.
This conclusion cannot be sustained under Bloustein's analysis of the tort, for it would seem almost incomprehensible to brand
the circulation of an embossed newspaper article (itself quite legitimate) as a "mortification, humiliation and degradation." It is
no surprise, therefore, that the court in Canessa concluded that if
"advertisement exploitation" were established, it is "irrelevant"
whether the use of the plaintiffs' image would deeply offend a per1 3
son of "ordinary sensibilities." '
In reaching this conclusion, Canessa points toward a second

126. 85 N.M. 655, 515 P.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1973).
127. Id. at 658, 515 P.2d at 662.
128. 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967).
129. Id. at 332, 235 A.2d at 62.
130. See Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, 186 N.J. Super. 335, 452 A.2d 689 (Ct.
App. 1982).
131. 97 N.J. Super. at 356-58, 235 A.2d at 78-79.
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possible explanation of the appropriation tort. Canessa defines appropriation as "an action for invasion of. . . 'property' rights and
not one for 'injury to the person.' "132 It cites in support of this
1 3 3 a very early case that interpreted
position Munden v. Harris,
appropriation as sounding in property:
One may have peculiarity of appearance, and if it is to be
made a matter of merchandise, why should it not be for his benefit? It is a right which he may wish to exercise for his own
profit and why may he not restrain another who is using it for
gain? If there is value in it, sufficient to excite the cupidity of
another, why is it not the property of him who gives it the value
and from whom the value springs?
We therefore conclude that one has an exclusive right to his
picture, on the score of its being a property right of material
profit.""'
If a casual letter can receive protection as property because it is
an original reflection of its author's personality, "as singular as his
countenance, ' 1 35 so the unauthorized reproduction of a person's
image can similarly be likened "to the violation 'of a sort of natural copyright possessed by every person of his or her own features.' "s36 If copyright can extend protection to the particular
"order of words in the author's composition, '13 so appropriation
can safeguard the particular "singularities," "lines," and "features" that fix and characterize a plaintiff's unique face.138 Understood in this way, the tort properly depends upon descriptive privacy, which delineates the measurable boundaries of the "thing"

132. Id. at 352, 235 A.2d at 76.
133. 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1910).
134. Id. at 659-60, 134 S.W. at 1078-79.
135. Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L. Cas. 814, 869, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 703 (1854).
136. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 649, 86 N.E.2d 306, 309
(1949). This same equation of personality and image appears in F. HARGRAVE. ARGUMENT
IN DEFENCE OF LITERARY PROPERTY (1774):
A strong resemblance of stile, of sentiment, of plan and disposition, will be frequently found; but there is such an infinite variety in the modes of thinking and
writing, as well in the extent and connection of ideas, as in the use and arrangement of words, that a literary work really original, like the human face, will
always have some singularities, some lines, some features, to characterize it, and
to fix and establish its identity ...
Id. at 7, quoted in Rose, supra note 80, at 72.
137. Jefferys, 4 H.L. Cas. at 867, 10 Eng. Rep. at 702.

138.

F. HARGRAVE, supra note 136, at 7.
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that has become property.139
Although this account of the appropriation tort preserves its
incorporation of descriptive privacy, it does so at the price of undermining the tort's authorization of damages for indignity and
mental distress. If appropriation sounds in property, then the object of its protection is the "value" of the image or name that is,

in effect, copyrighted. An allegation of copyright infringement
would not support an award of general damages for pain or suffering, 140 and neither ought an allegation of the infringement of an
essentially "common law copyright" of one's image or name. 14
Warren and Brandeis understood this quite clearly, which is why
they sought to disengage privacy from property.' 4 2 A decision like

Canessa that justifies liability in terms of the protection of prop-

erty,' 4 and yet that authorizes general damages for pain and suffering even in the absence of any ascertainable harm to that prop-

erty, thus runs a serious risk of internal incoherence, of blurring
the design and purposes of the law.
B.

The Future of the Tort

Our dilemma, then, is this: The descriptive privacy employed
by the second Restatement's definition of appropriation is consis-

tent with a property conception of the tort, but incompatible with
a remedial focus on indignity and mental distress. Such a remedial focus must depend instead for its justification upon normative
privacy. But normative privacy is inconsistent both with the elements of the tort set forth in the second Restatement and with the
view that the tort creates a property interest. The situation is fur-

139. Thus copyright law depends for its determination of originality upon the descriptive ascertainment of "patterns," as for example those of "characters and sequence of
incident." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
140. Social Register Ass'n v. Murphy, 129 F. 148 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904); 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 45, §§ 12.0-12.2; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 45, §§ 14.01-14.04.
141. The general common law rule is that torts relating to property will not support
recovery for mental distress unless there are involved "the types of preexisting relationships
which give rise to a duty of care [and] involve an aspect of trust and confidence," Sher v.
Leiderman, 181 Cal. App. 3d 867, 884, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 707 (1986), or unless the tort
is characterized by "fraud, malice, or like motives, involving intentional conduct." Charlie
Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, 171 Ind. App. 315, 328, 357 N.E.2d 247, 254 (1976).
142. It is of course possible to conceive property in one's name or image as so intimately connected to one's self as to justify damages for emotional distress. But this conception pro tanto denies the detachability of name or image and hence undercuts their legal
conceptualization as market property.
143. Canessa, 97 N.J. Super. at 351, 235 A.2d at 75-76.
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ther complicated by the right of publicity, which appears to offer
an exact counterpart of the appropriation tort rigorously concep44
tualized as a property right.1
An attractive solution would be to split the appropriation tort
into two distinct causes of action, one oriented toward the protection of property, the other toward the protection of dignity. The
right of publicity would serve as an appropriate model for the
first. Just as common law copyright extends to the objectification
of personality contained in casual letters, regardless of the amount
of effort required for their production, so the right of publicity can
be extended to the objectification of personality carried by one's
"name or likeness," regardless of the actual effort required to invest them with market value.
One difficulty with this solution is that it leaves the appropriation tort, as presently defined, resting upon the inadequate foundation of descriptive privacy. It is now clear that the appropriation
tort's incorporation of descriptive privacy was meant to compromise between property and dignitary rationales for the tort. But it
has served that function poorly, causing "an intermingling or confusion of the right of privacy and the right of control of the commercial aspects of one's identity.' 45 To focus clearly upon the
protection of dignity, therefore, the appropriation tort must be reformulated in terms of normative privacy, as it originally was in
the first Restatement.'14 As a practical matter this would mean
including as an element of the tort the requirement that a defendant's use of a plaintiffis name or likeness be "highly offensive to
the reasonable person.' 4 7 Such a requirement would orient the

144. J. Thomas McCarthy attempts to distinguish appropriation from the right of
publicity with the following useful chart:
Appropriation
(Privacy)

Right of
Publicity

Infringing Act

Unpermitted
Use of Identity

Unpermitted
Use of Identity

Impact

Upon Personal
Dignity

Upon Property
Right in Persona

Measure of
Damage

Mental/Physical
Injury

Damage to the
Value of Identity/Persona

J. MCCARTHY, supra note 106, § 5-63.
145. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 387, 280 N.W.2d 129, 132
(1979).
146. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 39-40, 42 (comparing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
652B, 652D, 652E (1976)).
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legal definition of the tort toward the social norms deemed necessary for the integrity of personality, thereby justifying compensation for emotional injury.
If the torts of appropriation and right of publicity were to be
clearly distinguished and analytically focused in this manner, a
second difficulty would arise. We must ask whether we as a society desire the law to conceptualize personality in the manner defined by either of these torts. The tort of appropriation makes
sense only on the presupposition that we inhabit a society supported by a coherent structure of communal norms. Yet such a
structure may be purely fictitious in a culture as diverse and dynamic as our own. Warren and Brandeis could, with the blithe
confidence of aristocratic preeminence, speak for a Brahmin vision
of community. But for whom can the tort of appropriation now
speak? What community can it establish as legally authoritative?
Conversely, with respect to the right of publicity, we must inquire
whether we wish the law to create a social structure in which our
very names and images have become alienable commodities.
Ought the law to facilitate and encourage such an intimate penetration of market standards? One hardly requires sophisticated
Marxist accounts of the alienation and reification of the modern
14 8
self in order to perceive the danger.
Current doctrine strongly suggests that we wish the law to
conceive persons as situated simultaneously within two distinct
forms of social structure: the matrix of community norms presupposed by appropriation and the arena of market commodification
presupposed by the right of publicity. I suspect that this bifurcated vision can be maintained only because community norms
have assimilated to such a great extent the standards of the market. We place moral value on the active, enterprising self, and we
view the market as establishing the social conditions necessary for
its development., 4 9 But it is also true that this bifurcated vision is
less stable than it might appear. Even if the market is conceptualized as a form of community life, it is a community that differs in
fundamental respects from that presupposed by the tort of appropriation. Appropriation valorizes those aspects of personality that
are embedded within social norms; the right of publicity valorizes

148. For a classic text, see G. LUKAcs, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS (R. Livingstone trans. 1968).
149. It is for this reason that the institution of property always tends at its edges to
verge toward nonmarket normative commitments. See Radin, supra note 119.
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instead those aspects of personality that remain autonomous from
and potentially transformative of those norms.
Because appropriation and the right of publicity flow from
such very different moral commitments, it may not be sufficient
simply to make either tort available at the election of a plaintiff.150 In certain circumstances we may want the right of publicity to efface appropriation. When a plaintiff sells the rights to her
image, for example, she transforms that image into a market commodity, a thing that is detached from her concrete person. Even if
the plaintiff sells her image for only certain purposes, and even if
a defendant exceeds those purposes in highly offensive ways, damages for mental distress may not be appropriate because we might
regard the plaintiff's image as having been removed from the matrix of community standards that justify and sustain the tort of
appropriation. These standards bind together person and image;
and hence are incompatible with the commodification of that image. There is sharp internal contradiction in the position of a
plaintiff who alienates and objectifies her image and simultaneously claims that it is integral to her very identity in the manner
15
presupposed by the tort of appropriation. 1
Market effacement of the tort of appropriation would be similar to the preemption suffered by the tort within the structure of
public discourse defined and sustained by the first amendment.
The Constitution maintains public discourse as a realm within
52
which speakers and audiences can exercise rational autonomy,1
and for this reason the tort of appropriation is almost universally
suspended when names or images are used within the media of
that discourse.'53 These limitations on the tort vividly illustrate

150.

This is essentially McCarthy's solution. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 106,

§

5.8.
151. It is possible, of course, to conceive the tort of appropriation like the Continental "Droit Moral," which recognizes artists' personality interests in their work that survive
market sale. See S. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND

"MORAL RIGHTS" 615-50 (1988); Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27
HASTINGS

LJ.1023 (1976). But then we must have some understanding as to how, with

respect to a particular plaintiff, name or image can simultaneously be both external to

identity and yet integral to it.
152. See Post, supra note 94, at 731-39; Post, supra note 38, at 626-44.
153. See, e.g., Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Leopold
v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970). The structural incompatibility between
the tort of appropriation and public discourse is so telling that most courts have refused to
apply the tort to public discourse even in the absence of explicit constitutional compulsion.
See, e.g., Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 908-10 (D.N.J. 1986); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440-42, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322-23, 449
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the systemic tension between social structures legally constructed
to facilitate the exercise of autonomy and social structures legally
constructed to maintain the forms of respect owed to the embedded self. The legal structure of market property, we might say, is
specifically designed to sustain volitional rather than rational autonomy; its point is to facilitate a self that acts upon the external
world. But the analogies between the market and public discourse
are clear enough; they in fact illuminate the otherwise puzzling
leniency with which the first amendment has been interpreted to
allow restrictions on public discourse based upon property
rationales. 5 4
If, in certain circumstances, the right of publicity may efface
appropriation, the converse may also be true. Although market
standards have to a large extent become morally valorized, they
may nevertheless radically conflict in particular instances with
older and deeper forms of community norms. The right of publicity in effect divides a person into two. On the one side there is the
objectified image, the persona, which has become a thing of value
capable of being owned and transferred. On the other there is
what Holmes would call the "natural personality,"' 155 which is acknowledged primarily in its capacity to generate through effort
new and different persona. Merely to observe this demarcation,
however, is to raise the possibility that natural personality might
in certain circumstances become intolerably enthralled by the objects of its creation.
The possibility is dramatically illustrated by the case of Chris
Costner Sizemore, a well-known victim of multiple personality disorder. In 1955 Sizemore signed a contract with 20th Century Fox,
in which she assigned to the studio "all . . . rights to my life
story, including without limitations in and to all versions of my
life story heretofore published or hereafter published and unpublished versions thereof.' 1 56 Fox subsequently used Sizemore's life
story as the basis for its successful movie The Three Faces of
Eve. 57 Although the movie ended on a happy note, Sizemore was

N.Y.S.2d 941, 943-45, (1982); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, 188 Misc. 479, 68
N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affid, 272 A.D. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
154. See supra notes 94, 108 & 119.
155. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 267 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
156. Hirshon, Eve's Final Face, Boston Globe, June 18, 1989, Magazine, at 24; see
Note, My Life, My Story, Right? Fashioning Life Story Rights in the Motion Picture
Industry, 12 COMM/ENT L.J. 627 (1990).
157. See Note, supra note 156, at 627; Hicks, Whose Life is Eve's. Anyway, NAT'L
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not in fact cured in 1955.158 In August of 1989, finally recovered,

Sizemore published an updated autobiography, the rights to which
Sissy Spacek wished to purchase to make into a film. 159 The project was aborted, however, when Fox objected, claiming "to own
all rights to Ms. Sizemore's life."160 Sizemore filed suit, alleging
that she had not and could not have assigned away the rights to
her life after 1955. Fox defended on the grounds that it held the
"sole rights to portrayal of Mrs. Sizemore's life in its entirety,
with no time limit." 161
The Sizemore case sharply illuminates the point that property
rights can be exercised in highly offensive ways, deeply damaging
to the kind of community norms that appropriation is designed to
uphold.162 To borrow from the vocabulary of a related area of ten-,
sion between market rules and community standards, it would
seem to be unconscionable to allow the objectification and alienation of a person's entire narrative history. Sizemore's complaint--"I want to own myself before I die"163 -is simply too
compelling to be denied. Surely if we care at all about the form of
life that appropriation acknowledges and defends, the social structures sustained by the right of publicity must in such circumstances yield to those upheld by appropriation.
It is not enough, therefore, simply to split the contemporary
appropriation tort into two, half protecting dignity and half property, and leave the election to plaintiffs. In the end, there will be
times when we will be forced to choose the circumstances in which
we will protect one aspect of personality or the other. This brief
paper is not the occasion to think through in detail the dense and
textured interaction between appropriation and the right of publicity. That enterprise ought to be pursued by those with a finer
grasp of its detail. It is sufficient for my purposes to reaffirm Warren and Brandeis's faith in the eternal capacity of the common

L., Oct. 23, 1989, at 8.
158. For example, the contract she signed with Fox had spaces for the signature of
five of Sizemore's personalities. Hirshon, supra note 156, at 24.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161.

Brozan, The Real "Eve" Sues to Film the Rest of Her Story, N.Y. Times,

February 7, 1989, § C, at 13, col. 1.
162. One might also say about the Sizemore case that it illustrates how the right of
publicity can, in certain circumstances, self-destruct, because commodified personality returns to smother the very intellectual effort it was designed to foster.
163. Hicks, supra note 157, at 8.
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law "to meet the demands of society." 164
CONCLUSION

Warren and Brandeis's great achievement was to discern that
our social life required legal protection for the dignitary as well as
the proprietary aspects of personality. It is for us to decide, in the
spirit of their magnificent contribution, whether the social prerequisites necessary to maintain individual dignity are sufficiently stable and coherent to merit legal embodiment, and whether and how
these prerequisites ought to intersect with those of the
marketplace.
The legacy of Warren and Brandeis contains both insight and
warning. The insight is that the law is a powerful instrument for
fashioning the forms of our social life. The warning is that we
must take care that the forms of life the law creates are those we
desire to inhabit.

164.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.

